Planet Not For Sale

Leaked TTIP Documents: Threats to Regulatory Protections

Eyes on Trade - 2 maio, 2016 - 21:58

Statement of Robert Weissman, President, Public Citizen

Note: Today, Greenpeace Netherlands leaked negotiating texts of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement, the proposed trade deal between the United States and Europe. The leaks include 13 of 17 consolidated texts, as well as a European Union memorandum on the negotiating state of play. This statement provides a preliminary analysis of one of the leaked chapters, Regulatory Cooperation.

Europe, beware. The leaked TTIP text confirms that the United States is trying to export its failed regulatory model. If the United States succeeds in its project, Big Business will gain enormous power to block, slow, undermine and repeal European regulations.

The leaked text makes clear that there are serious issues requiring analysis in particular sectors, but also that the Regulatory Cooperation chapter poses a major threat to health, safety, environmental, labor, consumer, civil and political rights, and other regulatory protections. The U.S. proposals in the Regulatory Cooperation chapter seek to export many of the worst features of U.S. rulemaking.

There is a lot to recommend about the U.S. regulatory process in theory, but in practice, the U.S. rulemaking process now evidences a massive tilt to favor the interests of regulated industries. It is far too slow; regulators are bogged down in seemingly endless analytic requirements that are themselves biased to favor the interests of regulated parties. Its veneration of “cost-benefit analysis” provides a pseudo-scientific cloak to industry’s apocalyptic claims about the costs of the next regulation and operates at loggerheads with application of the precautionary principle.

In the days ahead, Public Citizen will issue a more detailed analysis of the draft Regulatory Cooperation chapter. These are among our top line concerns from the U.S. proposals in that chapter:

  • Regulatory Delay – Paralysis by Analysis: Article X.13 would require parties to provide detailed and expansive justifications for their decision to issue a regulation, including consideration of regulatory alternatives. This is an inherently unequal obligation, because there is no burden to provide justification for doing nothing. In practice, the need to provide detailed justification for issuing a rule dramatically slows U.S. rulemaking.
  • Corporate-Biased Cost Benefit Analysis: Article X.13.1.c would require parties to conduct detailed cost-benefit studies of regulations and regulatory alternatives. It is important to understand that the U.S. understanding of the phrase “anticipated costs and benefits” is fundamentally different than the European conception of regulatory impact assessment. In the United States, cost-benefit analysis is an extremely technical concept involving extensive data collection and elaborate modeling, and it is generally understood to be a near-absolute decision-making criterion. Its highly technical nature obscures the fact that cost estimates frequently rely on regulated industry-provided data and are excessive, and that non-quantifiable or indirect benefits are frequently not captured.
  • One-Sided Analytic Requirements: Article X.13.2 would require parties to assess the impact of regulations on small businesses, a formal assessment under U.S. in certain circumstances that imposes extensive delay. It is also a one-sided required analysis, both under U.S. law and the U.S. TTIP proposal, because the specially required analysis looks to burdens (“adverse economic impacts” in the TTIP proposal) but not pro-competitive or other benefits to small business.
  • Look Back, Not Forward: Article X.16 would require parties to undertake retrospective reviews of regulations. This is, again, an inherently uneven process, because the instruction is to search for rules to revise or repeal, not for regulatory shortcomings or gaps requiring new initiatives. In practice in the United States, the obligation to undertake regulatory reviews demands valuable time and resources from agencies, and interferes with their ability to conduct forward-looking activity.
  • Trade Over the Public Interest: Article X.9 would impose a requirement for parties to consider trade effects of proposed regulations, and implicitly to justify any detrimental effects on trade. This is admittedly a soft requirement, but is notable inserting purely commercial considerations into regulatory decision-making and should be viewed as precursor to more robust demands in this area to follow.

Taken in their entirety, the U.S. Regulatory Cooperation proposals are affirmatively hostile to the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle counsels taking protective action in the face of uncertainty. The U.S. cost-benefit standards, demands for consideration of alternative regulatory approaches, and expansive analytic requirements also counsel for inaction in the face of uncertainty. Moreover, U.S.-style cost-benefit analysis places a premium on industry-provided cost estimates while effectively discounting benefits from action to prevent possible harm.

There is no need to overstate this tension; it is in fact possible to take precautionary action in a cost-benefit framework, as the United States sometimes does – but it is also the case that U.S.-style cost benefit is generally discordant with precautionary approaches.

The U.S. proposal notably does not include a requirement for judicial review of regulatory impact analytic requirements. This feature is central to the U.S. rulemaking process, but U.S. negotiators have recognized its incompatibility with European institutional arrangements. It remains to be seen how a regulatory cooperation chapter will intersect with the investment chapter. But irrespective of the intersection with the investment chapter, Europeans should be aware that, if the U.S. Regulatory Cooperation proposals are accepted and TTIP is approved, it is only a matter of time before the United States and U.S. corporations begin advocating judicial review of European compliance with the provisions of the Regulatory Cooperation chapter.

Judicial review is an inherent part of the logic of the U.S. system, and there is no doubt that U.S. corporate interests will insist that judicial review is required to enforce the terms of the Regulatory Cooperation chapter.

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Leaked TTIP text shows U.S. negotiators push to lower food safety standards, farmer protections

Subtitle:  Corporate fingerprints evident in U.S. trade negotiating positions Language:  English IATP author(s):  Karen Hansen-Kuhn File:  2016_05_02_TTIP_Leak_PR.pdf Minneapolis – Leaked negotiating texts for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) expose the heavy influence of corporate agribusiness in the negotiations, pushing to lower trade restrictions and public health regulations affecting food production, according to analysis of the texts by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP). The leaks, released by Greenpeace Netherlands today, provide compelling evidence in support of demands by opponents on both sides of the Atlantic for more democratic and transparent processes in trade...

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Minnesota Farm and Rural Groups Join 150+ Organizations to Ask Congress to Reject TPP, Stand Up for Independent Farmers and Ranchers

IATP author(s):  Ben Lilliston Author(s) (external):  Stephanie Porter, Land Stewardship Project File:  2016_04_27_TPP_Concerns_PR.pdf Minneapolis/St. Paul – The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has become a divisive issue in the nation’s capital, and criticism intensified after 161 food, farm, faith and rural organizations, including four from Minnesota, sent a letter to Capitol Hill today, urging lawmakers to reject the trade pact. “The main beneficiaries of the TPP are the companies that buy, process and ship raw agricultural commodities, not the farmers who face real risks from rising import competition. TPP imports will compete against U.S. farmers who are facing declining farm prices that are projected to stay low for years,” the organizations wrote. Minnesota...

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Environmental Impact Statement; Introduction of the Products of Biotechnology U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)

Language:  English IATP author(s):  Dr. Steve Suppan File:  APHIS biotech comment.pdf The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy[i] (IATP) appreciates this opportunity to comment on “reasonable alternatives and possible issues to be evaluated in the environmental impact statement” (Federal Register Vol. 81, No. 24, February 5, 2016, at 6225). IATP understands that the programmatic EIS resulting from the “Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement” (Notice) will be consistent with the guidance of the “Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology,” (Coordinated Framework) once it has been revised.[ii] IATP has submitted comments regarding that revision,x` and the following comment also reflects some of our views on the...

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TPP would hurt small scale farmers in developing countries, groups say

Subtitle:  Faith, development and sustainable agriculture groups call on Congress to reject TPP Language:  English IATP author(s):  Karen Hansen-Kuhn Author(s) (external):  Chloe Schwabe, Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns and Stephanie Burgos, Oxfam America File:  2016_04_18_TPP_Concerns_PR.pdf Minneapolis – More than 50 development, religious and sustainable agriculture groups are demanding that Congress reject the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) because of its potential impacts on small scale farmers and food production, especially those in developing countries. The signers include the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Oxfam America,...

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Letter to Congress over concerns about TPP's impact

Language:  English Author(s) (external):  IATP, et. al File:  food security tpp letter.pdf April 18, 2016 Dear Member of Congress, We write to you as development, faith-based and sustainable agriculture organizations concerned about the potential impacts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) on food security and sustainable development in the member countries and around the world. Many of us work closely with partners in developing countries and have witnessed the devastating impacts of previous free trade agreements on small-scale farmers and their communities. We urge you to reject the TPP. The TPP would expand many of the worst features of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Under NAFTA, more than two million Mexican farmers were driven from their lands after a dramatic...

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Audit of Administration’s ‘Tax Cuts’ Claim for TPP Reveals Cooked Numbers and Misdirects

Eyes on Trade - 18 abril, 2016 - 15:50

The Obama administration’s claim that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will deliver “tax cuts for 18,000 Made in America products” is wrong, a new Public Citizen analysis shows. The new Public Citizen report also addresses the real question from which the administration’s redirect to an impressive-sounding number distracts: Would cutting even 18,000 tariff lines necessarily equate to more U.S. exports, jobs or growth?

“The administration owes the public and Congress an explanation of how it cooked up what obviously is a false ‘TPP tax cut’ number, but more broadly touting a large number of tariff lines cuts misdirects attention from the real question of whether the TPP will create more American jobs or cause damage,” said Lori Wallach, direct of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch.

The disconnect between tariff lines cut and economic gains is spotlighted by the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which cut nearly 10,000 tariff lines. Yet, in its first three years, U.S. goods exports to Korea dropped 7 percent and the U.S. deficit with Korea surged 90 percent.

Public Citizen’s new analysis reveals that:

  • The claim about 18,000 tax cuts on Made in America goods is obviously wrong.
  • In 2014, the United States exported items relating to a total of 8,687 tariff categories to all of the 11 TPP countries. Even assuming tariffs remained in each category of products, and many already are duty-free, the TPP clearly would not deliver “tax cuts” for 18,000 U.S. products. (The administration says the 18,000 figure refers only to cuts with just the five TPP nations that do not have a U.S. trade deal and to these nations we sent exports in only 7,289 categories.)
  • That the administration’s 18,000 figure represents double, triple or quadruple counting also is revealed by reviewing Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand and Vietnam’s TPP tariff schedules. None list more than 10,000 tariff categories with many lines duty-free absent a TPP.
  • Whether tariff cuts translate into more U.S. exports or jobs relies on whether we make or TPP nations demand the relevant goods. For 5,830 of 7,289 categories (80 percent) in which the United States exported anything to the relevant TPP countries, sales were less than $5 million. A quarter had sales of less than $100,000. In only 21 of 7289 lines did we export more than $500 million and some of these already are duty free.
  • 1,225 of the tariff reductions in the products we do sell to the five TPP nations without U.S. FTAs won’t be realized for a decade or more. This includes goods we produce in volume, like beef, which will still face a 20 percent tariff in Japan in the tenth year after the TPP would go into effect.
  • The six TPP partners with which the United States already has FTAs collectively account for more than 80 percent of the trade counted in the oft-touted statistic that the TPP covers 40 percent of world trade. Thus, tariffs on U.S. goods going to Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Singapore already are gone or are being eliminated. So while TPP countries may account for 40 percent of world trade, the TPP would cut tariffs on only 20 percent of that 40 percent share.
  • Among the items the United States simply do not export are those relating to species that the administration claims the TPP’s Environmental Chapter will help conserve. Yet perversely, the list of tariff cuts that the administration counts as a benefit of the TPP includes Malaysia’s shark fin tariff, Vietnam’s whale meat tariff and Japan’s ivory tariff. 
  • Even setting aside the problem of currency manipulation, cuts translate into more market access only when tariffs are significant enough to make U.S. products uncompetitive. Japan comprises fully 88 percent of the combined gross domestic product of the TPP countries that do not already have a U.S. FTA, but Japan’s average applied tariff weighted by product import shares is now only 1.2 percent. Indeed, the tariff levels in the remaining five TPP are generally low.
  • The raw number of tariff lines countries agree to cut also does not tell us much about a pact’s effect on consumer prices. The TPP includes tariff cuts on the shoes Nike produces in Vietnam to sell here, but currently shoes that retail for more than $100 cost about $10 to make. The tariff is charged on the cost, thus even a major percentage cut does not equate to much money. And, whether a firm like Nike will reduce prices or simply gain more profit on an item imported for sale here is determined by what consumers are willing to pay for the product.
  • While firms importing goods into the United States will determine whether to pass savings related to U.S. tariff cuts on to consumers, the TPP’s reduction or elimination of tariffs does necessarily reduce U.S. Treasury revenue. According to President Barack Obama’s proposed 2017 budget, the TPP would cost the United States about $28 billion in lost tariff revenue over the next 10 years. (The calculation is based on the assumption that the TPP takes effect in 2017.)

The administration’s “TPP Guide to 18,000 Tax Cuts” document oddly highlights goods that TPP nations simply do not buy in volume from anyone. Consider the 34 percent “tax” cut by Vietnam on Alaskan caviar. In 2014, Vietnam’s per capita GDP was about $2,000 and about $150,000 worth of caviar was imported by Vietnam from anywhere. Or Vietnam’s 5 percent tariff on skis from Colorado. Vietnam imported only about $50,000 in skis in total. Other highlights: Vietnam and Japan will eliminate their tariffs on silkworm cocoons, Brunei will cut its tariff on ski boots and Vietnam will eliminate its tariff on camels.

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Farm to Childcare Lessons Learned Appendices

Language:  English IATP author(s):  IATP File:  All Appendices.pdf Appendices for the Farm to Childcare Highlights and Lessons Learned Related documents:  Farm to Childcare: Highlights and Lessons Learned Farm to Childcare Curriculum Package

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Dairy in Crisis: TPP Dumping on Dairy Farmers

Language:  English Author(s) (external):  Erik Katovich File:  2016_04_06_DairyImports_EK.pdf The U.S. dairy industry is currently threatened by a global dairy glut. Worldwide, milk production has increased nearly 40 percent since 1995, with the fastest increase occurring in the last two years.1 In the United States, dairy output exceeded 157 billion pounds in the first three quarters of 2015, and likely broke all-time production records for 2015 as a whole.2 As a result of this oversupply, global dairy prices have plummeted 55 percent since their peak in 2014, and are now at their lowest levels since 2009, according to data from Global Dairy Trade.3 According to Bloomberg Business, in early 2015, dairies in the northeastern United States dumped 31 million pounds of milk when processors...

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Investigation No. TPA‐105‐001:Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors (and Consumer Interests)

Language:  English IATP author(s):  Dr. Steve Suppan File:  US ITC TPP SPS comment 2 16 15.pdf Lisa R. Barton Secretary to the Commission U.S. International Trade Commission (Commission) 500 E Street SW Washington, DC Investigation No. TPA‐105‐001:Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors (and Consumer Interests) Submitted electronically – February 16, 2016 Summary The U.S. agricultural trade performance of so called “Free Trade Agreements” (FTAs) since 1994 has been anemic.  A recent review of six FTAs puts their collective agricultural trade deficit at $1.6 billion.1 U.S. agricultural exports have not delivered prosperity to farmers and ranchers. Instead, they depend Farm Bill subsidies to...

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Rural Engagement Critical to Success of Clean Power Plan, New Report

Subtitle:  State Energy Plans Could Support Cleaner Energy, Greater Rural Equity Language:  English IATP author(s):  Tara Ritter File:  2016_03_31_CleanPowerPlan_PR.pdf Minneapolis – The success of the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan will depend largely on state-level engagement with rural communities who are most directly affected by shifts in energy production, finds a new report from the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP). The report, “The Clean Power Plan: Opportunities for an Equitable Energy Transition in Rural America” by IATP’s Tara Ritter, concludes that states should actively integrate rural perspectives into their Clean Power Plan compliance plans. In February,...

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The Clean Power Plan

Subtitle:  Opportunities for an Equitable Energy Transition in Rural America IATP author(s):  Tara Ritter File:  2016_04_01_CleanPowerPlan_TR.pdf Rural America has long produced much of the nation’s energy. Most power plants, mines, gas drilling sites, wind turbines and dams are in rural areas, as are the farms and forests that provide the materials for biomass production. In many cases, these industries contribute greatly to rural economies. However, a majority of the nation’s energy is consumed in urban areas, where most of the nation’s people and infrastructure are located. This gap between energy production and consumption means that energy policy has very different implications for rural and urban communities. These differences are one reason why the Environmental...

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Talking Points: Response to 3/15/16 Peterson Institute Pro-TPP Paper

Eyes on Trade - 28 março, 2016 - 18:24
Below is a briefing note called, “Assuming Away Unemployment and Trade Deficits from the TPP” from the team at Tufts University that debunked the original Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) TPP study which this latest missive, “Adjustment & Income Distribution Impacts of the TPP” by PIIE’s Robert Lawrence and Tyler Moran, is premised. The key points are:
  • Of course Lawrence and Moran find that TPP’s benefits far exceed the adjustment costs: They use the findings of the PIEE TPP study (Petri-Plummer) derived from a model that does not allow for permanent job loss or increased trade deficits and assumes no increased income inequality. Those assumptions, which contradict the outcomes of each past major U.S. trade pact, mean TPP wage and employment losses are just temporary “adjustment costs” on the way back to full employment. If that were not sufficient to distort the new study’s findings, the authors also pile on more outlandish assumptions to minimize the number of workers likely to be affected and the impact on their wages.
  • With larger trade deficits and permanent job loss excluded by assumption, Lawrence and Moran then start discounting how many Americans would be hit even by temporary job displacement from the TPP by presenting three scenarios. 
    • They start with 1.69 million U.S. workers possibly displaced over ten years of the TPP.
    • They drastically reduce that total to 278,000 (mainly in manufacturing), by invoking another layer of assumption based on the underlying full-employment assumption: Rising demand will generate new jobs and thus limit job loss.
    • Then they reduce that to 238,000 workers by excluding workers who voluntarily leave manufacturing jobs, so the TPP can’t be blamed for those losses.
  • They then apply a formula to estimate the temporary adjustment costs (essentially lost wages) from those “displaced.” They compare these to Petri and Plummer’s reported U.S. TPP gains of $131 billion. Recall that these gains are based on the outlandish assumptions baked into the model. Another study that allowed for job loss and increased trade deficits found the TPP would result in net losses for the United States.
  • Lawrence and Moran’s resulting cost-benefit calculation does not report the costs, just the ratios, for the three scenarios. The authors report that for their “most realistic” scenario (#3), the one with the fewest displaced jobs, the benefits are 18 times the costs over the 10-year “adjustment period” (2017-26).
    • Then, they add in three “post-adjustment years” 2027-2030 and the ratio skyrockets to 115:1. Why? Presumably because with the full-employment assumption all displaced workers are, by then, happily employed in their new post-TPP jobs.
  • Finally, the authors also make the unfounded assumption that U.S. wages will increase at the same rate as productivity, though that has not happened for thirty years. This assumption automatically raises most workers’ incomes in their analysis. They also claim the assumed income gains will be much the same for each quintile of U.S. income distribution, with the bottom quintile seeing an increase 0.007 of a percentage point higher than the top. Technically, that’s mildly progressive. But consider it in terms of absolute gains: The bottom 40 percent sees just $8 billion in income gains, while the top quintile would get $48 billion. (i.e., more in absolute terms than the bottom 80 percent combined.)
  • The resulting cost-benefit calculations are misleading not only because the costs are assumed away, but also because the benefits are overstated. This latest paper takes the earlier Petri and Plummer estimates at face value, with all their flawed growth-boosting assumptions (such as a surge in foreign investment and most growth gains from non-trade measures). Plus, the gains are simply asserted to be large, when even the Petri-Plummer estimates of gains are incredibly small, just 0.5 percent of GDP for the United States in 2030, i.e., a paltry 0.029 percent per year on average over 15 years. How small is that? Even with all of the unrealistic assumptions, for the bottom 40 percent of U.S. income distribution, the gains amount to just $62 per person, in 15 years.



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Barack Obama en la Argentina

Blog de Javier Echaide - 24 março, 2016 - 01:46
La presencia del presidente de los EE.UU. Barack Obama en Argentina no es inocua. Como toda visita oficial tiene un propósito, pero el suyo se ata a un conjunto de motivos y relaciones que superan al "cambio" reflejado en la elección de Mauricio Macri como presidente de los argentinos, aunque no prescinde tampoco de ese dato.

El hecho de que además se dé simultáneamente (o mejor dicho, a propósito) de los 40 años del Golpe de Estado que inauguró la Dictadura Militar más sangrienta de la historia nacional, también es un dato que debe considerarse.

La visita de Obama en calidad oficial merece todo el protocolo que significa una visita de Estado. Ello implica la seguridad, el trato, el uso de símbolos (banderas en los lugares públicos habituales donde visitará, como la Plaza de Mayo, donde debe compartir el uso de las insignias oficiales argentinas). Ese trato que se demuestra muchas veces con una cena de gala -que el presidente de Francia Francoise Hollande no mereció- con baile de tango incluido -que el primer ministro italiano Mateo Renzi no tuvo- o las notas de color (e incluso notas dedicadas a la familia presidencial foránea!) que la visita de Federica Mogherini, comisaria de relaciones exteriores de la Unión Europea tampoco gozó.

Lo que la prensa más acomodada y la organización oficial, acompañado de una importante y lamentable mirada acrítica por parte de la ciudadanía, ha demostrado en esta visita oficial es algo que solamente puede decirse con una expresión cabal y ajustada que sólo un "dialecto" como el lunfardo podría definir: tilinguería. Con ello no criticamos la visita de Obama, sino que nos referimos a nosotros mismos. Somos tilingos. Esta visita oficial nos desvive, mucho más que la del primer mandatario italiano, la del francés, la del un urugayo o un brasileño. Argentina tiene, como Jano, una doble cara que mira con recelo a los Estados Unidos y otra que lo hace con devoción...

La explicación para ello suele basarse en que EE.UU. es el país más importante de la tierra, como si no estuviera perdiendo terreno a pasos agigantados frente a China o como si no hubiera una competencia retomada con vigor por Rusia en la política internacional. Como si no existieran los BRICS (de los cuales nos desvivíamos también hasta hace sólo año y medio...). Es que somos tilingos. No somos capaces de imaginar a una Argentina con política exterior de Estado capáz de entender a lo largo de más de 4 años (que es lo que dura un mandato presidencial) y que puedan fijar una lectura del mundo en el que vivimos y un trazo de hacia dónde dirigirnos en consecuencia. Y que esa dirección, ese camino, fuera una decisión autónoma.

Importa la visita del presidente de EE.UU., claro. Pero parece importar en tanto "nos va a ir mejor" con ella, como si fuéramos incapaces de pensar un futuro mejor para nosotros sin la visita de Obama. Por ende, nuestro futuro venturoso se hallaría aparentemente atado al futuro venturoso de los EE.UU. Es llamativo cómo no se piensa eso cuando nos visita el presidente francés, el premier ruso, o el chino (¡que lo han hecho además!).

Y esto no es algo exclusivo del presidente Macri -auque es evidente que su política exterior está diseñada a un alineamiento directo con los EE.UU.- El primer encuentro entre la entonces presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner y el presidente Obama también tuvo esa mirada devota... mirada que no volvió a darse en posteriores oportunidades.

El punto hasta aquí no es aquí hablar bien o mal de un determinado gobierno, sino analizarnos críticamente como sociedad, que deposita en otros, ajenos (sea Obama, el papa Francisco o quien fuere), los destinos de nuestras familias, nuestro trabajo, nuestro futuro en vez de reconocer que ese futuro está en nuestras propias manos.

La visita y la agenda

La oferta de Obama de desclasificar los archivos secretos de los años ´70 -algo que Macri pretende mostrar como logro propio (véase en su alocución durante la conferencia de prensa en el Salón Blanco de Casa Rosada- es parte de una necesaria autocrítica que realiza a 40 años del Golpe de Estado en Argentina y que su país apoyó activamente en aquel entonces. El papa Francisco ha ofrecido lo mismo respecto de los archivos vaticanos. Lo interesante es saber qué habrá de hacerse con esa información disponible de ahora en más. De poco sirven archivos secretos develados si los mismos no son utilizados como elementos probatorios en los juicios pendientes contra represores y civiles involucrados en los crímenes de lesa humanidad en curso.

Como decíamos, la visión carente de una interdependencia en las relaciones internacionales, pero interdependencia no pasiva sino fijada desde una autonomía que marque un espacio de decisión sobre los temas internacionales, es lo que marca el sentir de gran parte de la población que entiende a la visita de Obama como algo trascendente para nuestro porvenir en el corto (muy corto) plazo, dado que Obama terminará su gestión en tan solo nueve meses.

Así es: Obama es un presidente saliente. Macri uno entrante. No es pequeño detalle. Esta diferencia (que sin embargo no parece tan obvia) es elemental para sopesar las pretensiones de cada uno. Macri quiere garantizar su relación con un presidente norteamericano que será efímero y que necesariamente deberá dar paso a uno de los candidatos que hoy disputan las internas electorales estadounidenses.

Empero, el gobierno macrista traza la agenda bilateral con el actual presidente norteamericano sin siquiera tener un análisis sobre esa misma agenda en posibles presidencias como la de un Donald Trump, una Hillary Clinton o un Bernie Sanders. Eso parece fuera de la imaginación del gobierno de Cambiemos...

Es por ello que resalta en el discurso del presidente Macri que rescate -hasta en una insistencia notable- el "liderazgo" de Obama. Más allá de los discursos formales, hay en Macri una cuota de honestidad intelectual, sincera, y otra de oportunismo. Lograr una visita oficial por parte de la máxima comitiva norteamericana es, sin dudas, tomada por la gestión macrista como un "éxito" en sus 105 días de gestión. Pero además resulta evidente que la política exterior trazada por el actual gobierno argentino es inimaginable sin su acomplamiento a la agenda de los EE.UU.

Se abre entonces una época de "relaciones maduras" con EE.UU. en la que el seguidismo no es precisamente ni un buen síntoma ni un signo de maduréz. Los planes de Argentina en materia de política exterior (y esto tomando lo sostenido por el propio Macri en la conferencia de prensa frente a Obama) es adherirse a la Alianza del Pacífico y desde allí al Tratado Transpacífico (TPP por sus siglas en inglés), algo que es una de las principales cartas en materia comercial global... de los EE.UU., no de Argentina.

Objetivos: realineamiento político, agenda comercial (y ¿"pobreza cero"?)

EE.UU. ha relanzado su agenda de libre comercio a nivel global y para ello ha desplegado dos fuertes iniciativas: una para excluir a China del intercambio global y así recuperar terreno ante el gigante ya no tan dormido... Esto es el TPP. La otra iniciativa es la negociación bilateral que mantiene con la UE para firmar el Tratado Transatlántico (TTIP por sus siglas en inglés) que fijará el piso de las relaciones comerciales a nivel global, dado el peso específico de ambos jugadores en el comercio mundial y por la cantidad de relaciones bilaterales que tanto EE.UU. como los países de la UE poseen con el resto de los Estados del mundo. También por la aplicación de las cláusulas jurídicas específicas que se negocian en este acuerdo (como en otros de libre comercio) y cuyo efecto es irradiar los compromisos que establecen el mejor trato comercial. Hablamos de la denominada cláusula de la nación más favorecida (o cláusula NMF).

En dos meses Macri se entrevistó con los mencionados mandatarios de Italia (dos veces), Francia, la "canciller" de la UE y ahora el mandatariio norteamericano. Viajó además al Foro Económico Mundial en Davos, Suiza (y con una costilla rota), pero sin embargo, días después, se excusó por esa misma costilla para no estar presente en la Cumbre de la CELAC y las manifestaciones que apoyó que ha tenido con gobiernos de la región (como Brasil) han sido tangenciales y no oficiales (para las cámaras, en conferencias de presna). En otros casos (Venezuela) ha habido una total falta de diplomacia (que se pretende rescatar con la formalidad de la visita de Obama) y se ha juzgado sobre sus conmociones internas. El realineamiento hacia una agenda librecambista y, en términos regionales, pro-estanounidense ha sido evidente.

Los EE.UU. apuntan a Macri como punta de lanza dentro de la región para que traccione a los sectores de una "nueva derecha" regional hacia ese centro. Pero el alineamiento no es una cuestión de rótulos nacionalistas: la negociación de un tratado de libre comercio (TLC) entre el Mercosur y la UE se encuentran avanzadas y con un Brasil muy interesado en concretarlas. El cambio en la política exterior argentina hace casi inmediato la posibilidad de concretar esta negociación que ha estado trabada desde 2004.

Tanto el TLC con la UE como las negociaciones de un TLC entre Argentina y los EE.UU. van a tener como parámetro el piso establecido por el TTIP. Y el alineamiento argentino a la Alianza para el Pacífico hará lo propio sumando a la Argentina al TPP.

Las negociaciones por los TLC, fueren regionales o bilaterales, son la receta de los países centrales por superar sus propias necesidades de acumulación. La teoría del libre comercio fue pensada por el economista inglés David Ricardo e inspirada no en los pueblos agricultores africanos, los cuentapropistas chinos, las culturas indígenas o las PyMEs argentinas, sino en la pujante industria británica en ascenso deseosa por colocar sus productos manufacturados en todo el globo. Las ideas del liberalismo económico han cambiado poco desde entonces (siglo XVIII).

Sin embargo, en el discurso oficial, Macri sostiene que estos acuerdos ayudarán a general "pobreza cero" creando trabajos a partir del cuentapropismo (el llamado "emprendedorismo") y las pequeñas y medianas empresas (PyMEs). Sin embargo, las experiencias existentes desde hace 20 años en países como México adentro del Tratado de Libre Coemrcio de América del Norte (TLCAN o NAFTA, por sus siglas en inglés) demuestran todo lo contrario: una impresionante concentración económica, crecimiento con aumento de pobreza y sectores marginados que se vuelcan a industrias ilegales (y altamente peligrosas como el narcotráfico) para subsistir, pequeños productores quebrados, conocimientos ancestrales olvidados y extranjerización de la economía. Si EE.UU. se ha comportado así en 20 años en su TLC con México, ¿por qué esperar un resultado distinto con recetas similares hacia nosotros?

Dicho todo esto, es inevitable hacer una comparación con el ALCA. El Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas fue el proyecto librecambista que los EE.UU. presentó para todo el hemisferio, salvo Cuba y que quedó abandonado tras la VI Cumbre de las América celebrada en Mar del Plata, Argentina, en el año 2005. Sin un ALCA y sin una Ronda de Doha de 15 años de negociación sin resultados en la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC), EE.UU. ha lanzado otras iniciativas de tratados internaconales en materia comercial dividiendo a los países más proclives a los proyectos neoliberales de libre comercio (tal es la Alianza del Pacífico en el TPP) y excluyendo al mismo tiempo a China -competidor natural de EE.UU. en el mercado del Pacífico-. Se suma a este entramado el Tratado sobre Coemrcio de Servicios (TISA por las siglas en inglés de Trade In Services Agreement), negociándose por fuera del ámbito de la OMC. En suma, se trata de una estrategia político-jurídica para romper el multilateralismo y al mismo tiempo aislar a las principales "potencias emergentes" del comercio global: Brasil, Rusia, India y China. Y Argentina parece deseosa de participar pero pero menospreciando estos datos y concentrándonos en el cuantapropismo como trampolín del crecimiento...

TPP + TTIP + TISA: ese es el "Gran Recinto" que EE.UU. está diseñando para las próximas dos décadas. Llamativamente, dentro de ese "recinto" están incluidos Sudáfrica (miembro del TPP), Paraguay (miembro del TISA y también del Mercosur) y hasta septiembre de 2015 también lo estaba Uruguay, que se retiró del TISA por la inconveniencia de ese tratado para sus intereses político-económicos.

La visita de Obama no ha sido entonces un homenaje a los derechos humanos o una conmemoración a los desaparecidos durante la última Dictadura solamente. Involucra claros temas que son actuales y a futuro, como la protección de inversiones extranjeras dentro de los tratados de libre comercio como el TPP. El capítulo 9 del TPP es sobre inversiones y marca demasiadas similitudes con el capítulo homónimo del ALCA o los tratados bilaterales de inversión (TBI) que remiten al CIADI como modo de resolución de conflictos entre empresas transnacionales y Estados. La experiencia argentina en materia de demandas ante el CIADI debería alertarnos sobre lo riesgoso que son estos mecanismos frente a la posibilidad de diseñar políticas públicas. Las demandas de Aguas Argentinas contra la Argentina, Aguas del Tunari contra Bolivia, Philip Morris contra Uruguay y contra Australia, las dos demandas de Vattenfall contra Alemania o las 25 demandas que recibió España solamente en el 2015 son pruebas más que suficientes para aportar en este sentido.

Hay algunas pocas inversiones inmediatas demoradas por cuestiones administrativas. Pero las inversiones que tanto preocupan por su ausencia a la administración macrista no vendrán por estos acuerdos sino por un clima de negocios basado en el crecimiento del mercado argentino. Una inflación anual del 40%, una desocupación en ascenso y una recesión que parece que se profundizará en el 2016 en vez de revertirse, no son datos precisamente alentadores para favorecer ese clima... El Citicorp lo sabe y por eso vendió su capital accionario del Citibank en Argentina y hace menos de un mes.

¿Qué significa entonces en la boca de Obama estas inversiones aludidas? Empresas como Chevron, con contrato celebrado con YPF en la gestión anterior a la de Cambiemos, con un contrato con jurisdicción extranjera, negociado en secreto y con sentencia judicial de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación que exige su publicidad, sentencia que el actual gobierno ha desconocido y desafiado abiertamente al negar dicha publicidad. El cuidado de los intereses de contratos como estos pueden ser una parte de las preocupaciones privadas que se hallán detrás del declamado gobierno "del pueblo y para el pueblo"...

En resúmen: la visita de Obama se encuentra muy lejos de una visita turística para conocer Bariloche, bailar tango o regodearse en el glamour local. Es una visita con una clara agenda marcada para la siguiente administración norteamericana; para un reposisionamiento en la región y para concretar su proyección comercial a nivel global pensando más en sus propias necesidades que en las del pueblo argentino. Y desconocer estas realidades es montar una expresión de deseos negadora de una política internacional bien palpable.
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Following Breadcrumbs: TPP Text Provides Clues to U.S. Positions in TTIP

Language:  English IATP author(s):  Karen Hansen-Kuhn File:  2016_03_21_TPPonTTIP_KHK.pdf While civil society groups around the world raise a variety of concerns about the substance of free trade agreements, for the most part they begin their critiques with the lack of transparency. Despite their potentially far-reaching impacts on national economies, public services, and natural resources, trade deals are negotiated in secret, with the resulting agreements submitted for ratification without the possibility of amendments. This is as true in the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) as it has been for other bilateral or regional trade deals negotiated by the U.S. or EU. So instead of a robust public debate on the merits of the issues under negotiation,...

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President’s Annual March Trade Agenda

Eyes on Trade - 3 março, 2016 - 14:23

Administration Continues to Use Debunked Talking Points to Sell TPP

The Obama administration released the 2016 Trade Policy Agenda today as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) faces increasing bipartisan opposition in the U.S. House and Senate. However, instead of addressing the growing chorus of concerns in the 2016 trade agenda, the administration continues to push debunked talking points to the American people in hopes of selling the controversial agreement.

Public Citizen has already debunked most of talking points included in the 2016 trade agenda report:

Debunked talking point: More than 18,000 tax cuts on Made-in-America exports.

  • Reality: The Obama administration is trying to shift focus to an impressive-sounding number with its mantra about TPP delivering “18,000 tax cuts for Made in America exports.” But that is just the raw number of tariff lines cut by the five TPP nations with which the United States does not already have free trade agreements (FTAs). The United States only sold goods to those nations in less than 7,500 of the 18,000 categories. Indeed, the United States exports no goods to any nation under some of the touted 18,000 tariff lines.




Debunked talking point: The President’s trade agenda is focused on supporting U.S. jobs and raising wages.

 Debunked Talking Point: Putting more money in middle class pockets.

  • Reality: A recent study finds the TPP would spell a pay cut for all but the richest 10 percent of Americans by exacerbating income inequality, as past trade deals have done. That would contradict Obama’s 2015 State of the Union inequality reduction goal. Macroeconomic theory predicts if Americans face more competition from workers in Vietnam who make less than 65 cents/hour, wages will be pushed down. Sixty percent of manufacturing workers losing jobs to trade who find reemployment face pay cuts, with one in three losing more than 20 percent, per U.S. DoL data. There is academic consensus that trade has contributed to the major rise in inequality.

Debunked talking point: The TPP is preserving our environment.

Debunked talking pointThe TPP is promoting our values.

  • Reality: While the Obama administration is celebrated for its defense of gay equality after dust-binning the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and joining those announcing that the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional, it decided to allow Brunei to remain in the TPP even after the country announced that it would begin stoning to death gays and single mothers under new sharia-based laws. This has led to LGBTQ groups joining the TPP opposition.

Debunked talking point: The TPP is promoting the U.S. auto industry.

  • Reality: The TPP would threaten the president’s successful rescue of the U.S. auto industry and thousands of U.S. jobs. It would allow vehicles comprised mainly of Chinese and other non-TPP country parts and labor to gain duty free access. This would gut the rules of origin established in NAFTA that condition duty free access on 62.5 percent of value being from NAFTA countries. Ford has supported all past U.S. trade deals, but opposes the TPP.

Debunked talking point: 98 percent of U.S. exporters are small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

  • Reality: SMEs comprise most U.S. exporting firms simply because they constitute 99.7 percent of U.S. firms overall. However, only 3 percent of U.S. SMEs export any good to any country. In contrast, 38 percent of large U.S. firms are exporters. The relatively few small businesses that do actually export have seen even more disappointing export performance under FTAs than large firms have seen. U.S. small businesses have seen their exports to Korea decline even more sharply than large firms under the Korea FTA (a 14 percent versus 3 percent decrease), while small firms’ exports to Mexico and Canada under NAFTA have grown less than half as much as large firms’ exports. Indeed, small firms’ exports to all non-NAFTA countries have exceeded by more than 50 percent the growth of their exports to NAFTA partners.


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Debunking the Administration’s TPP = 18,000 Tax Cuts on U.S. Exports Talking Point

Eyes on Trade - 24 fevereiro, 2016 - 21:31

U.S. Sold Nothing in More than 10,600 of Those Categories...

Without compelling jobs or economic growth data to sell the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Obama administration is trying to shift focus to an impressive-sounding number with its mantra about TPP delivering “18,000 tax cuts for Made in America exports.”

But that is just the raw number of tariff lines cut by the five TPP nations with which the United States does not already have free trade agreements. The United States only sold goods to those nations in less than 7,500 of the 18,000 categories. Indeed, the United States exports no goods to any nation under some of the touted 18,000 tariff lines.

The 18,000 figure is a misdirect. The relevant question is not the number of tariff cuts other countries listed but whether the TPP would lead to net U.S. job creation, higher wages, an improved trade balance and higher U.S. growth rates.

  • The United States exported nothing for more than half of the 18,000 categories to the five relevant nations – Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, New Zealand and Brunei – in 2014, the last year for which annual data is available. U.S. exporters already have “tax cuts” for their goods under previous trade deals with the other six TPP nations, including Canada and Mexico – our second and third largest trade partners.
  • For the nearly 7,500 categories of goods out of the 18,000 for which we sold anything to the five nations without previous FTAs, almost 50 percent of the categories had sales under $500,000. And the TPP is not likely to transform that reality. Brunei (annual GDP $17.1 billion) is a tiny market. New Zealand (annual GDP $200 billion – smaller than San Diego) and Vietnam (annual GDP $186.2 billion – close to that of Denver) are not big markets. And, consumer demand is limited by Vietnam’s extremely low $2,052 per capita income. Malaysia’s per capital income is one fifth of that in the United States and its GDP is $338.1 billion, about the size of Atlanta. Japan is a huge market. But, with the exception of some agricultural goods, tariffs have not been the main barriers to U.S. exports to Japan. (GDP data from the World Bank)
  • Almost 2,000 of the tariff reductions in the categories of products the United States does sell won’t be realized for over a decade. This includes some of those, such as beef and pork to Japan, where tariff cuts could make a difference. But because the TPP does not have enforceable disciplines against currency manipulation, by the time these cuts finally go into effect they could effectively have been erased if Japan devalues the yen.

  • The administration’s “TPP Guide to 18,000 Tax Cuts” document bizarrely highlights goods TPP nations simply do not buy in volume from anyone. Consider the 34 percent “tax” cut by low-income Vietnam on Alaskan caviar. About $150,000 worth of caviar was imported by Vietnam from anywhere. Or Vietnam’s 5 percent tariff cut on skis. Vietnam only imported about $50,000 in skis in total.
  • Many of the tax cuts the administration has touted include those that the administration claims the TPP’s weak environmental chapter would conserve. Among the 18,000 tax cuts are Malaysia’s shark fin tariffs, Vietnam’s whale meat tariffs and Japan’s ivory tariffs.

Indeed, the “tax cut” list is packed with gems. Christmas ornaments and pork for Muslim nations Malaysia and Brunei. Silkworm cocoons for Vietnam and Japan. Ski boots for Brunei. Camels for Vietnam.

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Remarks at the National Press Club Panel on the Proposed Inclusion of ISDS in the TPP

Eyes on Trade - 17 fevereiro, 2016 - 21:47

Delivered by Lise Johnson, Head: Investment Law and Policy, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, at the National Press Club in Washington DC on February 11, 2016

With the TPP, we are currently at a crucial crossroads. We either take this time to thoroughly evaluate ISDS and its costs and benefits, which, I believe, would take us in a new and more thoughtful direction, or we simply move forward with the TPP, entrenching and expanding a failed experiment in economic policy.

I refer to ISDS as an experiment because, although it is commonly noted that there are 3,000 investment treaties around the world and, therefore, that the ISDS mechanism is nothing new, the first investment treaty with ISDS was actually not concluded until the late 1960s. Investment treaties with ISDS were not widely negotiated until the 1990s, and ISDS claims only really emerged in earnest in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, we really only have roughly 15 years of experience with this mechanism. ISDS is still a new area of law. An experiment.

I note that ISDS is a failed experiment because it does not appear to have achieved three of the commonly stated objectives of the mechanism. It has not led to increased investment flows, nor to a set of predictable international legal rights for investors, nor to an increase in the rule of law in host countries.

If the TPP were concluded with ISDS, we would not only be entrenching this failed experiment, but significantly expanding it. Currently, the US only has an investment treaty with one major capital exporting state, Canada, meaning that only a relatively small share of foreign direct investment in the US – roughly 10% -- is currently protected by a treaty with ISDS. With the TPP, the percentage of covered investment will more than double; and if we continue the trend in the TTIP as well, the amount of covered FDI in the US will rise significantly to approximately 70%, and along with it, the US’s exposure to costly litigation and liability.

Now, the US has said that the experiment has not cost the Government anything, frequently highlighting the point that it has yet to lose an ISDS case. But there are a few reasons why I don’t think we should count on the past to predict the future:

  • As I noted, the US’s exposure has been fairly limited; this will change with the TPP;
  • Second, in the cases the US has defended, the US has had near misses in which even the government officials working on the case thought the Government would lose; one explanation given for why arbitrators have been reluctant to rule against the US is that, if the US were to lose, it would back away from the system to the ultimate detriment of the arbitrators and counsel who make their living from ISDS cases. Thus, at least while the future of ISDS felt uncertain, it has been in the best interest of arbitrators to take it easy on the US.
  • Third, recent decisions reflect the significant delegation of authority under ISDS to arbitrators to interpret and apply the treaty, without any meaningful review or opportunity to appeal the arbitrators’ decisions. The tribunal in a recent case against the US, for example, stated that although all three NAFTA states unanimously agreed that the treaty meant “X”, it didn’t consider itself bound to that interpretation and proceeded to disregard it. This shows that there is no guarantee that tribunals will interpret treaty provisions in a way that is consistent with the US’s understanding of what treaty obligations mean.2
  • Fourth, the US has lost on key issues that have resulted in an expansion of exposure to future claims and damages.3

Moreover, irrespective of data on wins and losses, the system of ISDS itself is fundamentally flawed in that it creates a privileged and powerful system of protections for foreign investors that is inconsistent with, and erodes, the power of domestic law and institutions.

The USTR has defended ISDS against such charges by saying that the standards of protection investors receive under it mirror, but do not go beyond, the protections provided under domestic law and that therefore ISDS does not represent any change or threat to domestic law as we know it.4 But there are two key problems with the USTR’s assertion. One is that it is not correct that investment treaties do not provide foreign investors any greater rights than are provided under domestic law. We’ve done significant research comparing the protections provided under domestic law with those provided under investment treaties, and conclude that the protections provided under investment treaties in fact give foreign investors greater rights than they or anyone else have under domestic law.5 In fact, this seems to be why TransCanada, which is suing the US government as a result of the denial of the Keystone permit, is pursuing its major claim for $15 billion through the NAFTA as opposed to through domestic litigation.

But, even accepting the USTR’s argument that the substantive standards in investment treaties simply mirror substantive standards provided under US domestic law still does not address some of the significant concerns about ISDS. In this context, it is important to recall that ISDS allows investors to challenge actions of officials at any level of government – local, state, and federal, and conduct by any branch – executive, legislative and judicial. The fact that a measure is entirely consistent with domestic law is no defense or shield against liability.

What ISDS does is give private arbitrators the power to decide cases that, at their core, are merely questions of domestic constitutional and administrative law dressed up as treaty claims. Instead of recourse through local, state or federal domestic institutions, investors are able to take their claims to a panel of party-appointed international arbitrators and ask them to determine the bounds of proper administrative, legislative, and judicial conduct.

One might ask: what does it matter if we permit foreign investors to bring their claims against the government before international arbitrators as opposed to before domestic courts if the substantive standards of protection are the same? The answer is that it matters a great deal.

  • One, there is no route for a meaningful appeal. Even if a tribunal gets the law or facts wrong, its decision will likely stand;
  • Two, the decision makers in ISDS are free of the requirements of independence, impartiality, and high ethical standards that are mandatory for US judges;
  • Three, in domestic litigation, if a court issues a decision that is inconsistent with legislative intent, the legislature can pass a law correcting that decision; the legislature, however, has no power to undo or otherwise override an ISDS decision;
  • Four, the procedural rules and remedies are significantly different depending on whether an investor brings its claims through ISDS or through domestic courts, with meaningful impacts on the government’s potential exposure to claims and liability; and
  • Five, even if the law looks the similar, it is not the same. So, for example, although the TPP incorporates what superficially looks like the US’s test on regulatory expropriations, tribunals are not in any way bound to apply that test in the same manner as US courts.

Fundamentally, supranational adjudication—where the decisions of a supranational body can penetrate deep into a domestic society—is rare and raises a host of complex legal and policy questions. Much more consideration of these issues is important before we inadvertently dilute constitutional protections, weaken the judicial branch, and outsource our domestic legal system to a system of private arbitration that is isolated from essential checks and balances. This is not to say that supranational adjudication has no place in the American legal system, but rather that ISDS is an extreme, discriminatory and unnecessary version that will have undue negative effects on our domestic law and institutions.

  1. Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
  2. See Lise Johnson, “New Weaknesses: Despite a major win, arbitration decisions in 2014 increase the US’s future exposure to litigation and liability,” (CCSI 2015), at p. 8, available at
  3. See cases discussed Id.
  4. USTR, Fact Sheet: “Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS),” (March 2015), (“These investment rules mirror rights and protections in the United States and are designed to provide no greater substantive rights to foreign investors than are afforded under the Constitution and U.S. law”).
  5. See, e.g., Johnson and Volkov, “Investor-State Contracts, Host-State ‘Commitments,’ and the Myth of Stability in International Law,” 24 American Review of International Arbitration 361 (2013); Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, and Jeffrey Sachs, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest, and U.S. Domestic Law,” (May 2015), available at
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Resúmenes de fallos de la Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ), ¡en español!

Blog de Javier Echaide - 16 fevereiro, 2016 - 21:02
La Corte Internacional de Justicia ha actualizado su base de datos de resúmenes de sus sentencias y las ha actualizado al mes de diciembre 2015. Considerando que estamos en febrero de 2016, la actualización realmente es importante.
Antes de este trabajo, la disponibilidad de estos resúmenes se hallaban disponibles hasta el año 2013 inclusive.

Estos trabajos son de suma utilidad para el estudio del derecho internacional así como para su enseñanza. Los resúmenes son oficiales y realizados por la propia CIJ y puestos a disposición en seis idiomas, incluido el español. Los idiomas oficiales de la CIJ son solamente inglés y francés, por lo que la publicación de sus sentencias (en completo) sólo se hacen en dichos idiomas. El poder contar con estos resúmenes, que sean además oficiales, y que estén en español, son de muchísima utilidad.

¡A aprovechar!
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